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Editor's Note:  
This article analyzes the views of three different Iranian opinion groups - Conservatives, Moderates and 
Reformers - based on their responses to several measures of "regime support" contained in WPO's 
September 2009 survey. The three groups were initially identified on WPO's February 2008 Iran survey 
using Latent Class Analysis that was presented in an earlier article, "Iranian Public is Not Monolithic ...". 
The same three groups were recreated on WPO's September 2009 Iran survey, as well as its earlier 2008 
survey, using an easily replicable 7-point scale applied to responses on the same three government 
support measures. All three of the these measures tap the theoretical construct of "regime support," with 
Conservatives consistently supportive of the regime, Reformers consistently opposed, and Moderates 
having mixed views.  
With the post-election crackdown in Iran, a key question is to what degree Iranians are being effectively 
intimidated from expressing views that are at odds with the regime. This question is relevant to the 
regime's prospects for success or failure in its efforts to suppress dissent. It is also an important indicator, 
along with other trend measures, of whether surveys of the Iranian public continue to be valid. Very 
briefly, the present article finds only a modest decline in readiness to express dissenting views. 
Overview -- Comparison of the findings from the early 2008 and late 2009 Iran surveys conducted by 
World Public Opinion (WPO) shows that the number of Iranians who consistently express very critical 
views of their government associated with Reformers has fallen by just four percentage points amidst the 
current repressive climate (from 17% to 13%), and the number expressing moderately critical views has 
fallen by six points (from 46% to 40%). During this period, the number of Iranians who consistently 
express positive views of their political system associated with Conservatives has risen by 11 points (from 
36% to 47%). About one-fifth of these Conservatives (10% of the public) take a militant position against 
U.S. influence, and can be termed "Hardline Conservatives." The views of these several groups continue to 
diverge considerably on most public issues, with the notable exception that all groups mainly eschew 
Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Demographically, WPO's 2009 survey shows that Reformers tend 
to be younger, better educated and more likely to live in urban areas than Moderates and Conservatives. 
Regime support groups -- Three separate opinion groups within the Iranian public were initially identified 
in analyses of World Public Opinion's 1-2/2008 survey, using the statistical clustering technique Latent 
Class Analysis on three different measures of support for the Iranian government.1 Consistent with much 
ongoing analytical discourse inside and outside Iran, these three groups were labeled as Conservatives, 
Moderates and Reformers. The three groups differ sharply in how they view Iran's system of government. 
The same three groups were recreated on WPO's latest Iran survey (8/27-9/10/09),2 as well as its early 
2008 survey, using a simplified 7-point scale based on responses to the same three government support 
measures. All three of these measures, discussed below, tap the theoretical construct of "regime support," 
with Conservatives identified as those consistently supportive of the regime, Reformers consistently 
opposed, and Moderates having mixed views.  
Respondents who answered all three questions (89% of the 8-9/09 survey sample) were located on a 7-
point scale, ranging from 0 for those definitely opposing Iran's government on all three questions to 6 
points for those definitely supporting the government on all three questions. Three groups of respondents 
are identified based on these scores -- Conservatives (5-6 points), Moderates (2-4 points), and Reformers 
(0-1 point) -- and their divergent views mirror the diversity of opinion among Iran's political elites. 3  
Regime support measures -- The three major substantive groups within Iran's public are defined by their 
sharp and consistent divergence on these three WPO questions relating to support of the Iranian 
government ("regime support"): (1) Satisfaction with the Iranian election process ("very satisfied" given 2 
scale points, "somewhat satisfied" -- 1 scale point, and "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied" -- 0 
points); (2) Support for the government's right to censor destabilizing news (2 scale points) versus 
support for a free press (0 points); and (3) Trust in Iran's national government (trust "most of the time" -
- 2 scale points, trust "some of the time" -- 1 point, and trust "rarely" or "never" -- 0 points). (See Table 1 
for the exact wording and findings for each of these questions.) On each of these questions support for the 
regime declines sharply and progressively from the highest regime support (Conservatives) to the least 
regime support (Reformers). For example, the vast majority of Conservatives (91%) trust the Iranian 
government "most of the time," most Moderates (58%) trust it "some of the time," and most Reformers 
(65%) trust it "rarely" or "never" (see Table 1A).  
The three groups show naturally sharp contrast on the question containing only two choices -- having 
either media freedom or government censorship. All Conservatives favor the government's right to censor 
potentially destabilizing news and all Reformers favor media freedom. Moderates favor media freedom 
over government's right to censor media by a 61-39 percent majority (Table 1B).  
The three groups also differ considerably in their assessment of the process by which authorities generally 
are elected in Iran. Most Conservatives (64%) are "very satisfied" with the Iranian election process, most 
Moderates (61%) are "somewhat satisfied" with it, while the vast majority of Reformers (87%) are "not 
very" or "not at all" satisfied with the Iranian election process (Table 1C). The 11-point increase since 
2008 in the number of Conservatives identified by our regime support scale is due mainly to changes in 
response on this question. The number of respondents saying they were "very satisfied" with the Iranian 
election process doubled between the 2008 (20%) and 2009 (42%) surveys.4 In contrast, the number of 
respondents who said they trust the Iranian government "most of the time" rose only 1 percentage point 
(from 55% to 56%), and the number who expressed support for government's right to censor the media 
rose 3 percentage points (from 60% to 63%) between the 2008 and 2009 surveys.5 Employed together 
these three regime support measures should gauge the size and positions of different Iranian factions over 
time more reliably than would a single measure.  
Additional issues, besides the regime support measures, on which Iranian Conservatives, Moderates and 
Reformers diverge are discussed in the text below. These include other questions relating to Iran's 
domestic institutions (e.g., opinions regarding President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader) and 
perceptions of the U.S. government. Several instances of "partial divergence" will also be examined, in 
which two of the groups share fairly similar views on an issue, but these views differ sharply from those of 
the third group. An example of partial divergence is opinion of the American people, in which 
Conservatives and Moderates are both closely divided, while a large majority of Reformers have a 
favorable opinion. Then, several issues are examined in which the views of the three groups converge, 
including minority support within all groups for Iran's developing nuclear weapons and the widespread 
belief within all groups that a U.S. objective is to maintain control over Middle East oil resources.  
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1Latent Class Analysis (LCA) segmented the sample statistically into relatively homogeneous groups based 
on respondents' answers to the three questions relating to support for the Iranian government. Additional 
information about this analytical approach is contained in an earlier article co-authored with David B. Nolle 
and Elaine El Assal, "Iranian Public Is Not Monolithic: Iranians Divide Over Their Government But Unite on 
Forgoing Nuclear Weapons," World Public Opinion.org., 5/18/09.  
2This survey is based on telephone interviews with a sample of 1,003 Iranians. More than four-fifths of 
Iranians have landline telephones in their households. About half of the households contacted (52%) 
refused to be interviewed. 
3A number of scholars have written about the major political factions among the Iranian elites (see, for 
example, the works of Shahram Chubin, Akbar Ganji, Ray Takeyh, and Sanam Vakil), but comparable 
empirical analyses of the major political divisions in representative national surveys of the Iranian public 
are rare.  
4This increase between the 2008 and 2009 surveys is due to the increased percentage of Conservatives 
(from 38% to 64%) and Moderates (from 12% to 28%) who said they were "very satisfied" with the 
Iranian election process. None of the Reformers were "very satisfied" on either survey; in fact, about nine-
tenths of Reformers expressed dissatisfaction on both surveys.  
5Reference to the number of respondents here refers to the 89% of the sample who responded to all three 
regime support questions on the 2009 survey, and to the 70% who did so on the 2008 survey, and thus 
who could be scaled and categorized as either Conservative, Moderate or Reformer. Five other questions, 
besides the three regime support measures, were asked on both the 2008 and 2009 surveys. Two of these 
show distinct shifts, although not nearly as great as the 22-point change in very satisfied with the election 
process noted above: Favorable opinion of the U.S. government rose nine percentage points between 
2008 and 2009 (from 8% to 17%). Also, perception that a U.S. goal is to maintain control over Middle 
East oil resources fell eight points (from 87% in 2008 to 79% in 2009). However, on three other trend 
questions, as well as two of the three regime support measures discussed above, changes in response 
between the 2008 and 2009 surveys were only three percentage points or less.  
 
